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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY
ON HOW NOT TO REALIZE ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, AND A
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
*

Dr. Ubong E. Effeh
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Observers of sub -Saharan Africa (SSA) 1 have no doubt become familiar with
media images of one gruesome tragedy or another within the region – tragedies
which, although essentially economic in nature, have traditionally been highlighted by
human rights advocates in terms of its inability to realize the core rights proclaimed
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2: food,
healthcare, housing and education. 3 Africa thus continues to challenge the most
seasoned of political economists, while reaffirming the prejudices of those who
continue to believe in the “civilizing virtues” of colonialism. Theories upon theories
have been propounded. Countless “initiatives” have failed to make a difference.
Africa has been turned into the most aid-dependent region in the world, while its
people languish in misery. Put simply, the African status quo represents a depressing
case study on how not to realize these basic human rights.
This article aims to revisit some of the debates surrounding this very human
(and wholly avoidable) tragedy. The idea is to offer an alternative insight into what
might conceivably be the cause of so much human misery. More importantly, the
*

Dr. Ubong E. Effeh has earned his L.L.B. (N. London), his L.L.M . (Essex) and his Ph.D. (Kent) and
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1
Throughout the critique, the terms “sub-Saharan Africa” and “Africa” will be used interchangeably.
Both refer only to the 47 countries that lie roughly south of the Sahara desert (including the Islands
located in the nearby Atlantic and Indian oceans). These include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic),
Congo, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
2
Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) UN Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The ICESCR recognizes a variety of rights which
fall under the following broad headings: self-determination; gender equality; labour rights; social
security; family rights; adequate living standards (including food, clothing and housing); healthcare;
education; and cultural rights (including a right to benefit from scientific progress, and to the protection
of aspects of one’s intellectual property). It is also necessary to note that although the primary focus of
this article is on economic rights, this is in no sense an attempt to separate them from the better known
category of civil and political rights as proclaimed under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res.2200A
(XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Indeed, as will later
become apparent, such a distinction is often impossible to maintain.
3
These being the rights identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the
body charged with monitoring the realization of the rights proclaimed under the ICESCR) as
“minimum core obligations”. See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 3 (Fifth Session,1990), UN Doc.E/1991/23, para.10.
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article will examine the possibility of using existing principles of international law
(broadly defined) in a way that gives hope to a longsuffering people. In embarking on
a critique of this kind, however, it is recognized that questions relating to economic
development are best left to political economists. Nevertheless, it is also recognized
that the nature of the problem demands some measure of interdisciplinarity, if only
because this adds context to any legal analysis that will be offered.
A. The Dangers of Generalization
¶3

It is also necessary to acknowledge that the usual generalizations about the
region can be quite misleading: Although homogenous in many respects, it is in fact
an amalgamation of countries with varied characteristics. At two notable extremes are
the examples of Mauritius and Botswana, which are not only fairly accountable
democracies, but have combined economic growth with the progressive realization of
their people’s basic economic, social and cultural rights; while others such as the
bizarrely named “Democratic Republic” of Congo (which is neither democratic nor a
republic), Zimbabwe and Somalia have, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist as
viable States. At the same time, countries such as Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, and of
late, Mozambique and Uganda, although not paragons of democracy, have either
remained or have become relatively stable and are making efforts in the right
direction. Still, even these categorizations do not sufficiently capture the sheer
diversity of the region: Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, the Comoros, and
Guinea Bissau have all managed to survive with relatively few natural resources,
while Nigeria, Angola, and, of late, Chad and Equatorial Guinea have all been blessed
with substantial quantities of oil, although, as will be shown in Part III, the citizens of
most of these countries have become victims rather than beneficiaries of these
resources. Even the physical geography of the region could justifiably be seen as an
example of its diversity: From countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad
which endure the harshness of the Sahara desert, to much of west and central Africa
which broadly occupy the equatorial rainforest belt; from tiny island States such as
Mauritius and the Seychelles, to much of southern Africa with its semi-arid savannah
grasslands, Africa’s diversity has always been a surprise to the outsider, prompting
one respected commentator to assert:
[W]hen discussing the issue of human rights [on the continent as a
whole], it is important to remember that the internal dynamics of
individual countries are crucial to an understanding of the overall
human rights context...The myriad social, religious, cultural, political
and even idiosyncratic distinctions between the countries of the
continent all need to be taken into account. Thus, making broad
prognostications and drawing sweeping conclusions for a continent as
diverse and complex as Africa may be an exercise in futility. 4
B. The Case for a Generalized Approach

¶4

Although the validity of Oloka-Onyango’s assertion is beyond doubt, it is also
the case that an outright rejection of this “generalized approach” is, more often than
not, the first step in an attempt to deny the very existence of certain common features
that have come to define much of the region. Many of its countries, for example, have
either experienced fratricidal armed conflict of some kind in their post-colonial
4

J Oloka -Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary Africa: A New
Dawn or Retreating Horizons? 6 BUFF . HUM . RTS. L. RE V. 39, 40-41 (2000).

history, or are still enmeshed in one. Almost without exception, they have, at some
stage, been ruled by obnoxious regimes of one description or another – from oneparty or military dictatorships, to what are, in essence, criminal gangs operating under
the legitimacy of statehood – and in some cases, all of these combined. Except for
very few exceptions, such as Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, no government
within the region is willing or able to create the basic institutional and infrastructural
capacity necessary for supporting any level of sustained economic activity, and by
extension, the realization of basic economic, social and cultural rights (hereinafter
economic rights). Indeed, even among the so-called “emerging democracies,” very
few are truly representative or accountable to their citizens in the manner envisaged
under various international human rights instruments. 5 Nor should the widely
acclaimed economic growth in countries such as Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda
be taken out of context: Even if growth were a universally accepted yardstick for
measuring human development,6 these would still have to be judged against the
lowest possible base of past catastrophic conflicts in these countries, none of which, at
any rate, has yet regained its modest pre-war prosperity. 7 Thus, provided the
necessary caution is exercised, it is possible to adopt a generalized approach in a
project of this kind.
II. A SNAPSHOT OF THE STATUS QUO
¶5

That sub-Saharan Africa has become synonymous with economic
underdevelopment is perhaps too obvious to restate. What is often ignored is that as
well as being a depressing economic state of affairs, this is also a very human tragedy
– and one that appears destined to become much worse as time goes by. A snapshot of
the nature of the tragedy is shockingly instructive: More than 300 million Africans –
nearly half the region’s population – still live in extreme poverty. 8 The infant
mortality rate stands at 91 per 1000 births, while the adult literacy rates for males and
females are 30 percent and 47 percent respectively. 9 According to a recent
collaborative report by the World Health Organization, the maternal mortality ratio in
Africa stands at 830 per 1000,000, compared with Asia’s 330, with Latin America and
the Caribbean at 190.10 As if these were not depressing enough, the HIV/AIDS
5

See generally Art.21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948,
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GOAR, 183d plen. mtg., at 75, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]
(stating that “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections...”); Art. 25 of the ICCPR (broadly echoing the UDHR),
supra note 2, at 179.
6
For commentators on the broad political Left, the growth-based model is flawed because it does not
take account of factors that are not easily quantifiable in market terms. See, e.g., Gerald Karl Helleiner,
Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?, 10th Raul Prebisch
Lecture, Address at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Palais des Nations,
Geneva (Dec. 11, 2000).
7
The respective growth rates for these countries being: Mozambique 12 percent; Rwanda 9.7; and
Uganda 6.2. These, in any event, have been brought about by substantial aid flows of between 50 and
70 percent of their annual budgets. See Robert Guest, First Get the Basics Right, ECONOMIST , Jan. 15,
2004, at 3.
8
See A FRICA REGIONAL BRIEF 2002 (World Bank Group, 2002), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/africabrief.pdf. In discussing extreme poverty, it is important to note that
“...Africa’s poor are the poorest of the poor.” See CAN AFRICA RECLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY? 4 (World
Bank, 2000).
9
See W ORLD BANK A NNUAL REPORT (World Bank, 2004) 29, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2004/pdf/Volume_1.pdf.
10
MATERNAL MORTALITY IN 2000: ESTIMATES DEVELOPED BY WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA 2 (2004)
available at www.who.org.

pandemic is destroying lives on the continent at an alarming rate. A recent United
Nations report highlights the problems thus:
Approximately 3.5 million new infections occurred in 2001, bringing
to 28.5 million the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS in
sub-Saharan Africa. Fewer than 30 000 people were estimated to have
been benefiting from antiretroviral drugs at the end of 2001. The
estimated number of children orphaned by AIDS living in the region is
11 million. Even if exceptionally effective prevention, treatment and
care programmes take hold immediately, the scale of the crisis means
that the human and socioeconomic toll will remain significant for
many generations. 11
¶6

¶7

Neither is the situation regarding nutrition any less disturbing. According to a
joint UN mission to southern Africa in 2002, 12.8 million peop le were on the brink of
starvation. 12 At the time, aid agencies were quick to blame the recurring spell of
drought within the region. The on-going plague of locusts in the Sahel region may
also not be man-made, and, like all natural disasters, almost certainly could not have
been prevented. The disturbing fact, however, is that very few, if any, governments in
SSA ever have in place even the most rudimentary arrangements for any such
emergencies.13 For example, if nothing else, the provision of simple grain silos
would save the ordinary African the indignity – not to mention the agony – of
eternally relying on foreign aid when disasters strike.
According to a collaborative study involving several UK government
departments, as of 2000 over half of African countries were afflicted by war.14 In his
report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General stated:
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast
majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53
countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for
more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in
more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. 15

¶8

One year later, the Secretary-General also noted: “For many people in other
parts of the world, the mention of Africa evokes images of civil unrest, war, poverty,
disease, and mounting social problems. Unfortunately, these images are not just
fiction...”16 With all of these factors at play – in some countries at the same time – it is
little wonder that the life expectancy at birth in the region is only 47 years. 17 It also
11

RE P ORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 2002, U.N. GAOR Spec. Sess. on HIV/AIDS,
UNAIDS/02.26E at 22-23. See also AFRICA REGIONAL BRIEF, supra note 8, at 7.
12
World Population Foundation, SOUTHERN AFRICA HUNGER REPORTS: 12.8 MILLION LIVES AT RISK
(June 7, 2002), available at http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/in_depth/Africa/sa_main_page020607.htm.
13
As if to illustrate the point, a BBC report notes: “By responding quickly with pesticides, Arab
countries managed to contain the damage. But in western Africa, where governments do not have the
same resources to prevent the locusts from breeding, the situation is getting worse day by day.” Jannat
Jalil, UN Appeal to Stop Locust ‘Plague’, BBC NEWS, Sept. 4, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3628328.stm.
14
DFID ET AL, THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT 5
(2001).
15
The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 10, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/52/871S/1998/318 (1998).
16
Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential, U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, at i, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc.15 (1999).
17
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2003 5 (World Bank, 2003).

comes as no surprise that Africa has already become the only region in the world to
miss the crucial economic benchmarks for meeting the UN’s Millennium
Develop ment Goals (which include the reduction of poverty by half by 2015); 18 as
well as being the only region to have become poorer within the past 25 years. 19
III. POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICA: THE BETRAYAL OF A PEOPLE
¶9

The crimes that were committed against the people of Africa during the period
of colonization are of course a matter of record. From the systematic massacre and
gratuitous mutilations of some 10-20 million Congolese people under Belgian King
Leopold’s “rubber regime,”20 to the effective appropriation of the continent at the
Berlin Conference; from the conscious desecration of traditional societal
arrangements 21 to the systematic process of economic underdevelopment,22
colonialism constituted a deliberate dehumanization of a people in every imaginable
respect. Moreover, it was a flagrant violation of the basic right to self-determination
as proclaimed, at the time, under the UN Charter.23 Indeed, even without the untold
suffering and countless deaths that defined the trans-Atlantic slave trade, 24 these
crimes were in themselves sufficiently serious to warrant a struggle for independence
and self-determination.
¶10
Regrettably, however, independence for ordinary Africans has meant a life of
even more flagrant human rights violations —in many instances by their supposed
liberators. From the very beginning, the creation of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) in 1963 25 heralded the birth of an institution which was to become, whether by
18

See United Kingdom Department for International Development, DEPARTMENTAL REPORT 2002: THE
GOVERNMENT ’S EXPENDITURE PLANS 2002/2003 TO 2003/2004 58 (April 2002). See also The role of
theUnited Nations System in Supporting the Efforts of African Countries to Achieve Sustainable
Development Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Economic and Social Council, ¶ 13, 41,U.N. Doc.
E/2001/83 (June 12, 2001).
19
See First Get the Basics Right, supra note 7; see also A FRICA REGIONAL BRIEF , supra note 8, which
notes: “Africa is the only region in the world where the number of people living in extreme poverty has
almost doubled, from 164 million in 1981 to 314 million today.”
20
Although these crimes have never been formally documented, various sources have offered credible
accounts of these atrocities. See, e.g., A. HOCHSCHILD , KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF G REED,
TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL A FRICA 233 (1999) (10 million killed); Georges Nzonggola-ntalaja,
The Congo From Leopold to Kabila 22 (2002) (approximately 20 million killed).
21
For an excellent articulation of this see BASIL DAVIDSON, W EST A FRICA BEFORE THE COLONIAL
ERA : A HISTORY TO 1850 233-237 (1998).
22
This took various forms. Examples include: the inheritance, by Guinea Bissau, of an old brewery
which had been built to serve the Portuguese troops stationed there, 14 university graduates, and a 97
percent illiteracy rate after three centuries of colonial rule, DAVID LAMB, T HE AFRICANS 5 (1983); five
literate employees at the Mozambique education ministry overseen by a 23 year-old minister, SUSAN
GEORGE, A FATE W ORSE T HAN DEBT 86-87 (1994), at 86 and 87; while the Belgians left “a handful of
university graduates” in the Congo, AID AND REFORM IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM TEN CASE STUDIES
630 (Shantayanan Devarajan et al. eds., World Bank, 2001).
23
U.N. Charter art.1, para 2. Even if it were to be conceded that much of Africa was still under
colonization (and therefore not covered by this provision), the conduct of the colonialists would have
been in breach of Art.73 of the Charter, under which UN Member States “accept[ed] as a sacred trust
the obligation to promote to the utmost...the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories...” by
ensuring, inter alia, “with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political,
economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against
abuses...”
24
See ROUTES TO SLAVERY : DIRECTION , ETHNICITY AND MORTALITY IN THE T RANSATLANTIC SLAVE
T RADE (David Eltis and David Richardson eds., Frank Cass & Co, 1997). Ironically, desperate
economic circumstances have reintroduced this odious trade to the Continent. See T RAFFICKING IN
HUMAN BEINGS, E SPECIALLY W OMEN AND CHILDREN IN AFRICA (UNICEF/Innocenti Research Centre,
2003).
25
See ORGANIZATION OF A FRICAN UNITY CHARTER [hereinafter OAU Charter].

design or not, a legal framework for the perpetuation – and in many cases the
aggravation – of the people’s misery. The principles of non-interference and fraternal
solidarity became the overriding considerations in inter-African affairs. From a
human rights perspective, this meant that even the abuses that characterised the
immediate post- independence period received the approval of the organization, at
least insofar as it actively discouraged any external inquiry. It follows that even the
grisly violations that occurred under Idi Amin in Uganda, Marcias Nguema in
Equatorial Guinea, and “Emperor” Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African
Republic only managed to attract criticisms from very few Africa rulers, such as
Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia. 26 Indeed, as a veteran of the United
Nations human rights system, Philip Alston reveals that an attempt to include some of
Amin’s excesses – e.g., the massacre of 75,000 of his fellow citizens within four years
of coming to power – on the agenda of the UN Commission on Human Rights for
consideration met with strong opposition from African delegates, supposedly because
Amin was the chairman of the OAU.27 This resistance to scrutiny has continued to
this date, the most recent being the disingenuous protection of Charles Taylor by the
Obasanjo regime in Nigeria 28 from a UN-backed war crimes indictment for his role in
the grisly violations that defined the Sierra Leonean civil war.29
¶11
To be sure, the OAU Charter did make references to human rights concerns,
including the principles of the UN Charter and of the UDHR, but only to the extent
that they both “provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation
among States ”. 30 There was also an allusion to “the welfare and well-being” of the
people. 31 Nevertheless, it soon became clear that any reference to international human
rights norms was simply a hollow proclamation. At any rate, events on the ground
proved that the promotion of the “unity and solidarity of the African States” and the
defence of “their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence”, 32 however
perversely interpreted, were to be the cornerstone of its Charter, as was the principle
of non-interference in the internal affairs of member States.33
¶12
Oji Umozurike, who was later to become a Chairman of the African
Commission on Human Rights, articulated the prevailing attitude within the OAU
thus: “The OAU maintained an indifferent attitude to the suppression of human rights
in a number of independent African states by unduly emphasising the principle of

26

U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights, 77 AM . J. INT ’L L. 902, 903
(1983).
27
See THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 149 (Philip Alston ed.,
Clarendon Press, 1992).
28
Disingenuous because although some observers might be tempted to commend Obasanjo for
“averting a bloodbath,” two facts remain indisputable: First, the feared bloodbath had already been
suffered by the Liberian people before the intervention of Nigerian troops. Secondly, given that Taylor
had effectively become trapped in his “Executive Mansion,” an offer of asylum could serve only one
purpose: saving a beleaguered tyrant from an imminent demise.
29
For the text of Taylor’s indictment, see The Prosecutor Against Charles Ghankay Taylor (aka
Charles Ghankay Macarthur Dakpana Taylor), Indictment, Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL
-03-1 (Mar. 3, 2003) available at http://www.sc-sl.org/taylorindictment.html. See also Press Release,
Liberia: Nigeria's offer of "asylum" to President Taylor flouts international law, AI Index: AFR
34/015/2003 (Public), News Service No: 162 (July 7, 2003), available at www.amnesty.org.
30
OAU CHARTER, supra note 254, at para. 9.
31
Id., para.10.
32
Id., Art. II, para. 1(a) and (c).
33
Id., Art. III, para. 2. For an excellent critique of this topic, see J Oloka -Onyango, Beyond the
Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa 26 CAL . W.INT ’L L. J.
1, 42 (1995).

noninterference...”34 Of particular interest is what amounted to a direc t admission by
Sekou Toure of Guinea that the organization was not "a tribunal which could sit in
judgment on any member state's internal affairs.”35 Moreover, the rights of individuals
were usurped by “the State” in the name of “collective rights,” often in support of a
perverse notion of “African values” or of Marxism – an ideology which had become
fashionable at the time, but which very few of the region’s rulers seemed to
understand. As one commentator noted: “Although claimed in the name of African
ideals, collective rights serve state interests as well as the few who control state
resources...[M]ost violations of human rights are often against those who speak out
against the corrupt use of state resources.”36 Neither was economic development—
and by extension, the realization of economic rights—a priority. As noted by the late
Claude Ake, “[t]he struggle for power was so absorbing that everything else,
including development, was marginalized.”37
¶13
The indigent people of Africa have thus become caught in a tragic paradox: they
were “liberated” from the yoke of colonial exploitation and all that went with it, only
to become trapped in what have been decades of tyrannical misrule, systematic
impoverishment, and merciless exploitation by their own rulers. It follows that the
ideals of economic emancipation – the supposed inspiration behind the quest for
independence – has become the subject of escapist antics, 38 grandiloquent rhetoric, 39
and/or outright buffoonery. 40 Indeed, although political power no longer seems to
induce the same degree of psychosis that appeared to be commonplace in the Banda
and Amin days, 41 countries such as Zimbabwe, Guinea Bissau and Equatorial Guinea
have still not managed to escape the scourge of psychotic tyranny. It comes as no

34

UMOZURIKE, supra note 26, at 902.
Id. at 902-903.
36
Sakah S. Mahmud, The State and Human Rights in Africa in the 1990s: Perspectives and Prospects
15 HUM . RTS. Q. 485 , 493 (1993). Indeed, it had been noted earlier that this was the case regardless of
the State’s ideological inclination. HARRY M. SCOBLE , Human Rights Non -Governmental
Organizations in Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospects in the Wake of the Banjul Charter, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ronald I. Meltzer eds., State
University of New York Press, 1984).
37
See C. Ake, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 7 (1996).
38
The latest example of such antics being the so-called New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD), which is apparently a substitute for simple practical measures at the domestic level (e.g., the
creation of basic State institutions and infrastructure) without which no sustainable economic activity
can ever be possible (Relevant information available at http://www.nepad.org/en.html).
39
Indeed, according to one source, Mobutu and his ilk saw themselves as spokesmen for Africa’s
economic emancipation. See W INSOME J. LESLIE, Z AIRE : CONTINUITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN AN
OPPRESSIVE STATE 162-164 (1993).
40
Amin’s ghoulish escapades aside, Mobutu is known to have changed his name from Joseph Desire
Mobutu, to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Zabanga, which means “the earthy, the peppery, allpowerful warrior who, by his endurance and will to win, goes from contest to contest leaving fire in his
wake.” As if not to be outdone, Malawi’s “President-for-Life Ngwazi Dr H Kamuzu Banda” is reported
to have decreed thus: “Only to Banda belongs the right to wear a three-piece suit, top hat, carry a flywhisk and ceremonial cane. Woe betide him that may exhibit the temerity to question or trample on
this executive prerogative.” For both accounts, see GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY , AFRICA BETRAYED 105
(1993). Further, Mobutu is reported to have once dismissed his political opponents as power-hungry
opportunists, in spite of having wielded unfettered powers for well over three decades himself. See S.
Kiley, Zaire: Apocalypse Now, T IMES (London), July 31, 1993, at M10. He is also known to have once
argued that “Zaire’s one-party state system is the most elaborate form of democracy.” See AYITTEY ,
supra, at 210.
41
According to one report, a clause in a car hire contract obliged the hirer, on seeing Banda’s
motorcade, to drive off the road, switch off the engine, get out of the car, and stand to attention until
the motorcade had passed. See Theodore Dalrymple, Is There a Doctor-President in the House?: The
Unhappy History of Physicians as National Leaders, NATIONAL REVIEW , March 8, 2004, at 28.
35

surprise therefore, that twenty-nine of the thirty- four – over 85 percent – of the
poorest countries in the world (in terms of human development) are from SSA.42
A. The Scourge of Incessant Wars
¶14

It was no less a person than the UN Secretary-General who asserted thus in
1999: “For many people in other parts of the world, the mention of Africa evokes
images of civil unrest, war, poverty, disease, and mounting social problems.
Unfortunately, these images are not just fiction...”43 Post-independence Africa has
therefore become synonymous with armed conflict. But this reputation has not come
about as a matter of ill luck. To begin with, some of the region’s rulers became
enmeshed in the Cold War game plan, apparently unable to appreciate that save for
the odd evident bluff (suc h as the Cuban Missile Crisis), the main protagonists never
seriously considered engaging each other in direct armed conflict. In the meantime,
Africans became victims of supposed ideological wars in countries such as Ethiopia,
Mozambique and Angola. 44 Indeed, in the case of Angola, its warring factions were
not only unconcerned about the catastrophic impact of the conflict on their fellow
citizens, but also became oblivious to the tragic irony that Russia had, by the 1990s,
virtually become part of the G-7, and was in fact negotiating the terms of its
association with the NATO alliance at the time. 45 In a television documentary
highlighting the impact of the war on the Angolan people and expressing the hope that
the death of the notorious warlord, Jonas Savimbi, would bring them peace, a visibly
exasperated veteran ITN reporter, Michael Nicholson, was moved to remark: “...in
Africa, things don’t quite happen the way they should.”46 Even where there had been
no full-scale armed conflict, the impact of the Cold War was no less catastrophic; in
Zaire, Mobutu’s role as a supposed bulwark against communism became a license to
oppress, brutalize, and impoverish his people in a way that had very few parallels in
other parts of the world.47
¶15
Although the Cold War provided a convenient excuse for some of Africa’s
wars, it was by no means the only one; African rulers do not seem to need any such
excuse. Hence, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea have, until recently, been
enmeshed in what has been widely described as one of the most senseless wars in
history. 48 Indeed, Africa has even managed to create its own “world war” right in the

42
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heart of the continent.49 In his report to the UN Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral highlighted the scourge of conflict within the region:
Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast
majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53
countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for
more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in
more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. 50
¶16

By 2000, over half of African countries were affected by war, according to a
paper published jointly by the UK’s Department for International Development, the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence. 51 Armed conflicts
have become something that ordinary Africans must learn to live with.
¶17
Even as the international community is being duped into believing that a
supposed peace accord signed by the warring factions in the Congo would bring an
end to the brutalization of the people of the region, 52 the Ivory Coast, long regarded as
a beacon of hope for other African countries, has descended into bloody anarchy, due,
in no small measure, to decades of tribal marginalization – a tried and tested means of
exercising political power on the continent – and one which has been successfully
exploited by the rebel factions in that country. 53 At the same time, Charles Taylor’s
tyranny in Liberia would almost certainly have been replaced by the equally
murderous rebel gangs that were poised to overrun the country’s capital, but for the
intervention of foreign troops. 54 Nigeria, for the time being, appears to remain united
only because its plundering ruling elite has a commo n interest in its vast oil reserves.
Even here, stability cannot be taken for granted, with past rulers excluded from the
plunder apparently determined to accentuate and exploit religious and tribal diversity
to their own ends; 55 a situation which will almost certainly result in a repeat of an
attempt, between the late 1960s and early 1970s, to exterminate the mainly Igbo tribe
in the south east of the country – in retrospect, a precursor to what was to follow over
two decades later in Rwanda. There is thus a clear pattern of leadership merely
serving the narrow interests of Africa’s ruling elites, who, in the meantime, continue
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to exhibit a contemptuous disregard for the basic needs and interests of ordinary
Africans.
B. The Plague of Kleptocratic Misrule
¶18

Very few commentators would dispute the fact that Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire
had become the very embodiment of “rule by theft” on the continent of Africa before
his death. This, to be sure, is not without foundation: Mobutu not only emptied his
country’s treasury into secret bank accounts abroad, but allowed this insidious ethos
to permeate every level of government.56 But Mobutu was not alone; neither was his
misrule particularly unique on the continent. As early as the immediate postindependence years, Nigerian rulers had begun to set an example that was to become
a living testament to mind-boggling profligacy, if not to supreme folly. This was
highlighted in the English Court of Appeal case, Trendtex Trading Corporation v
Central Bank of Nigeria. 57 Although its legal significance is not of relevance to this
article,58 the facts remain a source of great embarrassment to many African students
of commercial law (and indeed, of international law): Defence ministry officials had
ordered 20 million tons of cement from some 80 different suppliers, at a cost of over
US$8 billion (in 1975 prices). Unsurprisingly, over 400 ships converged on Lagos,
with more arriving daily, completely paralysing a port that was, in any event,
inadequate for such shipments. As explained by Lo rd Denning MR:
All the berths were occupied. There were 300 to 400 ships outside
waiting. More ships were arriving daily...All of those waiting were on
demurrage. It was because the government departments had ordered far
too much. No doubt Nigeria needed cement. It was a country which
was developing fast. They were building houses, factories, barracks,
and so forth. All of the work required cement. Previously the average
rate of import through all ports had been two million tons of cement a
year. Yet early in 1975 the government departments then in
charge...had ordered 10 times that quantity...to be delivered over the
next 12 months...Even for all commodities together, the discharging
capacity at Lagos...did not amount to two million tons a year. Yet here
was 10 times that amount arriving - of cement alone - leaving nothing
for other vital imports of food and materials.59

¶19

To be sure, no evidence of corruption was adduced in Trendtex; but neither
would that have been necessary in light of the nature of the main question put before
the Court of Appeal. In any event, given that an incoming military regime found it
necessary to describe the various transactions as "unorthodox, imprudent or
inequitable," 60 this cannot be ruled out either. Whatever the case, the Trendtex episode
was to become a mere prelude to how the country was to be misgoverned, with the
Abacha regime taking “Mobutuism” to a different depth, adeptly combining Mobutu’s
56
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plundering disposition with a degree of viciousness unparalleled in Nigeria’s
history. 61
¶20
Neither are these the only examples of corrupt misrule on the continent.
According to a recent report by Human Rights Watch, between 1997 and 2002, the
Angolan government had been unable to account for funds totalling about US$4.22
billion. The report adds:
In those same years, total social spending in the country –
including...government spending as well as public and private
initiatives funded through the United Nations’ Consolidated InterAgency Appeal – came to $4.27 billion. In effect, the Angolan
government has not accounted for an amount roughly equal to the total
amount spent on the humanitarian, social, health, and education needs
of a population in severe distress. 62
¶21

Indeed, another report by The Economist reveals that up to 20 Angolans are
worth $100m or more. Six of the seven richest of these are government officials; the
remaining one only recently retired. 63
¶22
And, just when these were becoming perhaps the most glaring examples of
kleptocratic misrule on the continent, Teodoro Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea treated
viewers of a recent Channel 4 television news programme to an astonishing insight
into his approach to governance: It was indeed the case, he admitted, that his
country’s new found wealth from oil, a “state secret,” was kept in his personal bank
account in Washington. This, in his words, was because: “I am the one who arranges
things in this country because in Africa there are a lot of problems of corruption, the
diversion of money. If there is corruption, diversion of funds, then I'm responsible.
That's why I'm a hundred per cent sure of all the oil revenue because the one who
signs is me.”64 As it happened, the only beneficiaries of this mindless plunder were
shown to be his immediate family, with his son shamelessly exhibiting a collection of
expensive cars, sampling fine wines and exquisite watches in Paris. In the meantime,
the only hospital in the capital – built by Spain during the colonial days – was
overwhelmed with victims of malnutrition, as well as patients suffering from ma laria
and other diseases. Indeed, as if to illustrate the fact that the level of psychosis that
defined the Banda and Bokassa years has not diminished on the continent, the
country’s State-owned radio is reported to have declared that Mr Mbasogo “can
decide to kill without anyone calling him to account and without going to hell because
it is God himself, with whom he is in permanent contact, and who gives him this
strength. ”65 In virtually every part of the continent, its people have become helpless
victims of rulers who have become insensitive to their suffering, and contemptuous of
their basic needs.
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C. The Charade of “Democratic” Governance
¶23

An impoverished Nigerian tailor, Muhammad Umaru, reportedly said: “When
we were in the military regime, we didn’t get anything from the government, but we
had peace. Now we are in a democracy, we don’t get anything from the government,
and we don’t have peace.”66 Regrettably, such views are often ignored in academic
literature on Africa. Instead, there appears to be a deter mination to highlight a
supposed new dawn of democracy in the region. A collaborative paper published by
the World Bank puts it thus: “Most...African governments conceded the principle of
democracy in the first half of the 1990s. By 1999 nearly all countries had held
multiparty elections...”67 An IMF paper also highlights how supposed political
liberalization and participatory democracy are complementing economic reforms in
the region. 68
¶24
The reality, however, is that the so-called new breed of leaders are in no way
different from their immediate post- independence contemporaries, and are in many
ways worse. Indeed, the apparent manifestation of democratic governance has so far
proved to be a cynical façade – a smokescreen for the preservation of the past. Even
Thabo Mbeki’s much-vaunted quest for an “African renaissance,” for example,
appears to be rooted in sheer escapism and astonishing obtuseness: a feckless attempt
to challenge the universally accepted scientific fact – that AIDS is caused by the HIV
virus – rather than in taking steps to reverse the pandemic itself.69
¶25
In Nigeria, this supposed new democratic, post-Abacha era began with
legislators awarding themselves up to 3.5 million naira in furniture allowances (about
$35,500, in a country where the average monthly civil service salary is only about
$200), rather than taking steps to alleviate the suffering of ordinary Nigerians. 70 The
same country’s supposedly democratically elected leader, Obasanjo, has not only
proved himself a consummate human rights violator, but has in fact sought to justify
the massacre of unarmed civilians by his military forces.71 Another, report highlights
systematic and widespread violations of civil and political rights, particularly freedom
66
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of expression, by the country’s security agencies acting with absolute impunity. 72 In a
decision remarkably reminiscent of Felix Houphet Boigny’s squandering of his
nation’s resources on a multi-million dollar basilica when the personal incomes of
ordinary Ivorians were deteriorating by as much as 50 percent, 73 Obasanjo evidently
regards the installation of a satellite system in space to be a more urgent governmental
function than improving the healthcare and educational needs of his fellow citizens. 74
The same ruler, for good measure, is currently negotiating the purchase of missile and
other defence technologies from North Korea. 75 On his part, Paul Biya of Cameroon,
in 1999, had a personal airport built near his presidential retreat of Mvomeka. 76 As if
not to be outdone, the King of Swaziland has elected to squander the equivalent of his
country’s entire health budget of $45 million on the purchase of a private jet, at a time
when his people are either dying of starvation, or of HIV/AIDS, if not both. 77
¶26
The above are by no means the exception. In 1985, Mengistu and his obnoxious
Dergue regime in Ethiopia treated the world to what was most probably the worst
post-Biblical famine it had ever witnessed – a tragedy which prompted the Live Aid
campaign. Roughly two decades afterwards, the people of Ethiopia, this time under a
supposed democratic dispensation, experienced a repeat of this tragedy, due in no
small measure to a senseless war with neighbouring Eritrea. 78 Indeed, the UN
Secretary-General was so infuriated by the conduct of both nations that he cast his
diplomatic discretion aside during a newspaper interview and lamented:
The quality of the leaders, the misery they have brought to their people
and my inability to work with them to turn the situation around are
very depressing...In many countries the wrong kind have made it to
leadership. They seek power for the sake of power and for their own
aggrandisement rather than having a real understanding of the need to
use power to improve their countries. 79
¶27

In Liberia, a supposed democratic mandate given to Charles Taylor after his
brutal war which led to the ousting and the eventual murder of his equally vicious
predecessor, Master Sergeant “General” “Doctor” Samuel Doe, became a licence to
subject his people to further misery, as he set about plundering his country’s
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irreplaceable rainforest for personal gains. 80 Even Nyerere’s successors in Tanzania,
not long ago, elected to waste the country’s meagre resources on the purchase of a
sophisticated military air defence system, even though fees have been introduced in
schools. 81
¶28
It is therefore understandable that a recent Human Rights Watch report devoted
a section entitled: “Elections, But Not Necessarily Democracy” to highlighting
various human rights violations on the continent, including rigged elections, the
suppression of press freedom, and torture and political killings.82 The hollowness of
political reforms in Africa has also been illustrated by the newsmagazine The
Economist, which declared: “A new sort of African leader is trying to break the
addiction to foreign aid, and to the idea that Africa's woes can be blamed forever on
the legacy of colonialism…Little noticed by the rest of the world, much of sub Saharan Africa is in the midst of an upturn.”83 Three years later, the same publication
highlighted the reality of African leadership in a cover story titled “Hopeless
Africa.”84 One keen observer of the region, commenting on freedom of expression,
asserted:
The veneer of democratization that accompanied the achievement of
self-government was rapidly stripped away by leaders anxious to
preserve their version of national unity, and/or by military elites who
shot their way into power. Multi-party systems were consolidated into
single -party systems, then into one-man systems. With the ‘second
independenc e’ of the 1990s, in which open political competition
returned to many countries, freedom of expression seemed to obtain a
new lease on life. In my judgment, however, the overall climate
remains inhospitable.85
¶29

For ordinary Africans therefore, a supposed ne w era of democracy on the
continent has simply been a repeat of the transition from colonial subjugation to one
of economic misery and tyranny; the very notion of democracy itself yet another
instrument in the arsenals of the region’s merciless despots.
IV. A PROFUSION OF SPECIOUS THEORIES

¶30

One of the most tragic realities of post-colonial leadership in much of Africa is
that the chaos it has created easily lends itself to all manner of theories. One measure
of this disorder is that almost every one of these theories seems to carry a certain
degree of validity – except when subjected to even the most cursory examination.
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A. Africa: A Victim of History and Culture
¶31

One common theory is that Africa’s inability to develop is a function of its
history and culture. This position has been most forcefully articulated by The
Economist: “[M]ost of the continent’s shortcomings owe less to acts of God than to
acts of man...brutality, despotism and corruption exist everywhere – but African
societies, for reasons buried in their culture, seem especially susceptible to them”
[emphasis added]. 86 And it concluded: “Africa’s biggest problems…were created by
African society and history.”87 A major World Bank study, while acknowledging that
the “roots of state failure” in the region are “many and complex,” nevertheless
concludes: “Chief among them has been a continuing struggle between traditional
forms of governance and social organization (often based on tribes, lineages, and
language and kinship groups) and modern forms of government.”88
¶32
Yet proponents of this theory have failed to identify this supposedly
homogenous cultural pattern amongst the people of the region, which is inherently
inimical to the realization of human rights. Indeed, although there is a definite,
discernible “culture” of misrule at the level of leadership, Africa is an amalgamation
of various “cultures” – a fact acknowledged thus by another human rights advocate
from the region: “... [T]he diversity of African peoples and their societies defy easy
categorization or generalization.”89 In any event, there are numerous historical
accounts of practices in pre-colonial Africa that are in consonance with established
human rights norms. For example, according to another African commentator, the
virtues of participatory democracy and freedom of expression were well entrenched in
the African social order before the arrival of the Europeans; these being particularly
evident at village meetings where views were freely expressed and ideas exchanged,
in societies where the concepts of justice, order, and fairness were well developed. 90
Indeed, although the practice of slavery is hardly reconcilable with universally human
rights norms, a renowned African historian reveals that even those regarded as slaves
could own property, elect and send representatives to the King’s court, and request an
audience with him – hence, a certain Jubo Jubogha (renamed Jaja by the Europeans),
who was born in 1821 and sold as a slave to a Bonny trader in 1833 in the Niger delta
area of present-day Nigeria, was later elected head of the Anna Pepple House, and
succeeded the King in 1863. 91
¶33
Another African commentator, Kofi Busia, describes a system of checks and
balances – an indispensable element to modern democratic governance, and thus, to
the realizatio n of human rights – in his native, pre-colonial Ghanaian society:
Although the Akan chief is renowned for wielding enormous powers, this is only
theoretical; the chief rarely makes policy. In the wider traditional setting, the chiefs
are never above the customary norms and taboos that govern everyone else. To check
their power, they are surrounded by various bodies and institutions. Before taking
office, the chief is often required to take an oath. In the case of the Krontihene of the
Ashanti, part of the formal admonition is: “When we give you advice, listen to it. We
do not want you to abuse us; we do not want you to regard us as fools; we do not want
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autocratic ways; we do not want bullying; we do not like beating...take the stool.”92
Further examples have been proffered, such as the existence of freedom of movement
and of association. 93 The right to education, it is explained, was a collective
responsibility, although the primary emphasis was on the virtues of good
citizenship.94
¶34
Whether these practices are reflective of the general state of affairs in precolonial Africa is of course a matter of conjecture, not least because much of Africa’s
history is rooted in the oral tradition, with its inherent methodological problem of
unreliability. Indeed, for every such example of adherence to human rights, it is
possible to cite others that point to the contrary: The traditional practices of female
genital mutilation95 and wife-beating96 are hardly compatible with universally agreed
human rights standards. Neither is the usual emphasis on collectivism (at the expense
of individualism) 97 unproblematic when set against the language of the UDHR.98
Nevertheless, to suggest that certain traditional practices are responsible for Africa’s
economic backwardness represents a misleading and dangerous extrapolation – and
one that has assisted in no small measure in diverting critical attention from the real
cause of the region’s dismal economic situation.
¶35
To be sure, many African rulers themselves have often sought to justify their
human rights violations by appealing to a perverse notion of what human rights
advocates often describe as “cultural relativism” – a theory which holds that because
societies are products of their peculiar historical and cultural development, their
conceptions of human rights must necessarily be allowed to reflect such experiences.
In effect, this theory rejects the universality of human rights, 99 by invoking certain
alluring (if ill-defined) notions such as “African culture,” “African values,” or
“African civilization.” A good example of this tendency is evident in the continent’s
human rights instrument, the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights – itself
an absurdity in human rights terms, given the peculiar circumstances of its adoption100
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– the preamble of which affirms “the virtues...and the values of African
civilization.”101 This, it is safe to assume, reflected a speech by the then Senegalese
leader Leopold Senghor, in which he urged the Charter’s drafters to “keep constantly
in mind our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa.”102 Indeed, if the
African Charter represents the legal blueprint of this mindset, the earlier cited
Channel 4 television news report on Equatorial Guinea highlights its real- life
manifestation: In spite of being the world’s fastest growing economy due to its newfound oil wealth, its people continue to languish in economic misery. 103 Challenged
by the intrepid Lindsey Hilsum about this, its ruler retorted: "I can assure you that
there's no poverty in Guinea...[t]here's no deprivation either...You have to understand
the level we're at in Guinea. The first problem is the people's cultural level. The
people are used to living in a very different way, which you people think is poverty.
In Guinea what we have are shortages." 104 An equally absurd explanation was
proffered in response to a question on the lack of democratic accountability: “I think
Equatorial Guinea's democracy is the most open, the most transparent. We are
following a kind of democracy which fits the style and customs of Equatorial
Guinea.”105
¶36
Mr Mbasogo, to be sure, is not a trailblazer amongst his peers. As noted by Jack
Donnelly, his predecessor and uncle, widely acknowledged as one of Africa’s most
vicious tyrants – and who was murdered by Mbasogo in a co up that brought him to
power – called himself “Grand Master of Popular Education, Science, and Traditional
Culture.”106 Indeed, as Donnelly points out, similar arguments have been proffered by
other African despots. For example, Hastings Banda of Malawi successfully stifled
opposition to his rule by subjecting his victims to a very un-African judicial process
called “traditional courts,” in which the accused had no right to legal representation,
and from which they could appeal only to him in person. 107 Mobutu, for his part,
revived the practice of Salongo – a kind corvee labour inherited from his country’s
colonial past. 108 Indeed, it is safe to assert that the usual mantra, “African solutions to
African problems,” is an offshoot of this perverse mindset. From the vociferous
defence of Mugabe’s conduct by his fellow rulers in spite of the misery he has
inflicted upon the Zimbabwean people,109 to the shielding of Charles Taylor from
violated its own Art.13(1) which states: “Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the
government of his country...”
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international justice by Nigeria’s Obasanjo, this appeal to cultural relativism has
exposed ordinary Africans to a life of unparalleled misery. Little wonder, therefore,
that as will be illustrated in Part V, responses by the international community to the
continent’s tragedies are often based on undisguised cynicism: Africa, it appears, does
not deserve the basic rights which the rest of the world is beginning to take for
granted because its values and expectations are peculiarly different.
B. Post-Colonial Africa: A Victim of Berlin
¶37

Another thesis attributes Africa’s wars and economic problems to the outcome
of the Congress of Berlin and the consequent partitioning of the continent in 1885
along what is widely believed to be arbitrary boundaries. The resultant dislocation of
traditional arrangements, it is argued, has been a source of conflict in much of the
continent. 110 Even the usually persuasive Basil Davidson has become one of the main
proponents of this viewpoint:
[I]n 1885, half a dozen powerful European nations...decided to share
out Africa...but not, of course, without going to war against
Africans...Africa was being divided up into many ‘colonies’...ruled
directly and dictatorially by European governments, along frontiers
fixed between the European powers...A great and deep disaster for the
peoples of Africa, the colonial period deprived them not only of their
political freedom and the right to think for themselves, thus bringing to
a stop the onward flow of Africa’s own history, but also, in large
measure, undermining their sense of confidence and self-respect. 111

¶38

Yet, it was Nelson Mandela who once asserted: “Africa is beyond bemoaning
the past for its problems. The task of undoing that past is ours...we must take
responsibility for our own destiny, that we will uplift ourselves only by our own
efforts in partnership with those who wis h us well.”112
¶39
It is also hard to ignore the fact that, as pointed out by the former Africa
specialist of The Economist Richard Dowden, none of the factions in the region’s
wars is calling for changes to boundaries drawn by the colonial powers; in fact, many,
if not all, of the wars have been instigated by individuals seeking access to the
trappings of power at the centre. 113 In any event, it is the case that colonialism did also
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forge what might be described as an artificial union between the native Malays, the
Chinese, and the Indians in Malaysia, a country comparable in many respects with
Ghana, but which has managed to outperform the entire region of SSA (including
South Africa) economically. 114 Indeed, it is ironic that the most heterogeneous
country in SSA itself (namely Mauritius), with its medley of racial and religious
groups – including Hindus, Muslims, Creoles, native Africans, and Europeans – has
achieved a level of development that has eluded even the most homogenous countries
in the region. 115 Moreover, even if the redrawing of boundaries were the solution to
Africa’s problems, its proponents might wish to explain why it was unable to prevent
what was, even by Africa’s standards, a most senseless war between Ethiopia and
Eritrea soon after the latter’s secession following a 1993 referendum supported by
both sides. The inescapable fact is that a tragic – though by no means unique 116 –
event in the continent’s history has become yet another excuse for commentators who
are unwilling to accept that African rulers owe certain basic responsibilities to their
long-suffering people.
C. The Economic Dependency Thesis
¶40

The dependency thesis, widely attributed to the late Stephen Hymer, posits that
international economic relations are premised on an inherent power imbalance
between rich and poor countries, mediated by the modern transnational corporation
(TNC), whose organizational structures – e.g., the global distribution of its decisionmaking centres – and policies inexorably result in “specialization by nationality.”117
Poor countries, it is argued, thus find themselves in a position of “structural
subordination” vis-à-vis the industrialized ones. 118 Indeed, much of this thesis is
evident in the writings of political leaders such as the late Nyerere of Tanzania, who
mused: “First, where in our lands are those citizens who have sufficient capital to
establish modern industries; and second, how would our infant industries fight other
capitalist enterprises?”119 Of late, this argument has been revived by no less than
Fantu Cheru, who, while acknowledging the impact of wrong policy choices by SSA
governments, is equally scathing about what he sees as the rules established by
Western European powers, by which the region would participate in the global
economy. Put simply, Africa was to produce raw materials and agricultural goods for
Western industries and consumers: coffee and tropical fruits by Kenya, cotton by
Sudan, bananas and pineapple by the Ivory Coast, cocoa by Ghana, and groundnut by
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Senegal. 120 The implication, of course, is that Africa remains a casualty of these
“rules.”
¶41
There is little doubt that this theory had some validity in the immediate postindependence years, not least because colonial ties were still strong at the time, with
many developing countries retaining their roles as sources of raw materials for
finished products in Western markets. With the passage of time, however, the theory
seems increasingly at odds with the facts. For example, its proponents would have
much difficulty in explaining why it is that Ethiopia and Liberia, which have never
been colonized in the sense described in Part III – and therefore presumably have
never been subject to such “rules” – have become two of the poorest and most chaotic
countries in the region. Moreover, it remains unclear why such “rules” should apply
more rigidly to Africa than to any other region of the world. Indeed, even if it were
the case that certain unknown factors or forces have conspired to keep Africa in such
a disadvantageous position, the emergence of countries in “developing Asia” from
such apparent colonial designs – not to mention Mauritius, itself a SSA country –
makes it possible to argue that such “rules” can in fact be “broken” with imaginative
leadership.
D. Africa: A Casualty of the Global Economic Regime
¶42

Of all the theories offered to explain Africa’s inability to develop, this one
seems the most persuasive. A variant of the dependency thesis, and an article of faith
amongst commentators on the broad political left, it holds that Africa is a casualty of
an unfair, ideologically-driven global economic order whose interests are inherently
detrimental to those of poor countries generally. 121 Indeed, it has become the fuel that
propels the engines of the anti- globalization movement, and is often articulated in the
contexts of the region’s crippling debt burden and its inability to trade. 122
¶43
To be sure, the perils of globalization have been acknowledged by even its most
ardent proponents. 123 Indeed, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC),
if nothing else, represents an implicit admission of the inappropriateness of the
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund on the region following the debt crisis. 124 Yet, as
Frances Stewart points out, these po licies did not simply emerge from the blue, to be
imposed on economies that were otherwise healthy. 125 Flawed though they were,
120
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SAPs were an attempt to rescue the region from a leadership unwilling to see beyond
its own selfish interests. It is, after all, the case that to this date, no commentator can
point to any single poverty-alleviating project in the region that is attributable to the
loans that resulted in the debt crisis, although at least some of the proceeds have
almost certainly financed the most egregious human rights violations by some
governments, such as Mengistu’s in Ethiopia and Mobutu’s in Zaire – not to mention
the apartheid regime in South Africa. Nor can one ignore the fact that the most
vociferous advocates of trade liberalization preside over the most protectionist
economies, particularly in the areas in which Africa might be said to have what
classical economists call comparative advantage, namely primary produce. 126
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Yet too much is often read into this state of affairs, at least insofar as
commentators often ignore the fact that the United States and the European Union
(amongst the most powerful trading countries) have put in place preferential regimes
aimed almost exclusively at SSA. 127 These regimes, to be sure, are not beyond valid
criticism. Eligibility for the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act
scheme is based, inter alia, on its beneficiaries’ willingness to adopt wide-ranging
neo-liberal reforms that are not dissimilar to the much-discredited SAPs; 128 while the
EU’s Everything But Arms initiative currently excludes certain “sensitive” products,
namely, rice, sugar and fresh bananas. 129 But then, to expect a purely altruistic trading
regime, or indeed, the morally impeccable practice of “fair trade,” would amount to a
dangero us misunderstanding of the very essence of international economic relations:
the preservation of national self- interest, however defined. In any event, it is also
important to note that from all indications, even these relatively preferential regimes
have not been utilized to any significant degree130 – an unsurprising state of affairs
given Africa’s notorious, near-total lack of institutional and infrastructural capacity, 131
126
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without which no meaningful or sustainable economic activity is possible. Moreover,
the very fact that much of “developing Asia,” once in the same state of colonialism
and underdevelopment as Africa, is emerging as an economic powerhouse in its own
right, globalization notwithstanding, 132 illustrates the simple fact that Africa must not
wait until self-interest is completely eliminated from international economic relations
before its rulers begin to adopt the very elementary measures necessary for the
emancipation of their people from economic misery. 133
E. Perspectives From African Rulers
¶45

Unsurprisingly, African rulers have accepted no responsibility whatsoever for
the continent’s depressing state. For example, the so-called Lagos Plan of Action –
itself a 1980s version of the much-heralded NEPAD134 – blamed Africa’s economic
woes on “[t]he effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies...”135 It
adds, “...despite all efforts made by its leaders, [Africa] remains the least developed
continent...exploitation has been carried out through neo-colonial external forces...”136
This view was later echoed by Nigeria’s ambassador to Washington, who reportedly
stated: “Certainly, Nigeria is not free from worldwide economic and social malaise,
largely caused by external factors, like unfavourable trade terms and fluctuating
commodity prices.”137 And this, in spite of the fact that economic mismanagement
and endemic corruption has meant the conscious neglect of the country’s agricultural
sector by each of its post-independence regimes in favour of oil, which, as of 2002,
accounted for over 95 percent of the country’s export receipts. 138 This escapist
mindset has become the basis for Africa’s interaction with the rest of the world, as
evidenced during the recent collapse of world trade talks in Mexico, where its
delegates were among the most vociferous in blaming protectionism for their
countries’ inability to trade, 139 even though as already noted, very few of the region’s
countries are in a position to utilize the current preferential regimes, particularly those
offered by the EU and the United States.
V. AFRICA’S MISERY: SOME DISTURBING INSIGHTS

¶46

Of all the explanations often proffered for Africa’s state of chronic
underdevelopment, some of the most insightful and persuasive are those offered
(separately) by George Ayittey140 and Nicolas van de Walle. 141 For Ayittey, the
T IMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at 10.
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people of the continent have been betrayed by their rulers – an elitist and “arrogant
bunch of oppressive kleptocrats” who, in much of the region, are “worse than the
European colonialists.” Africa, he notes, “has been hijacked by gangsters, crooks, and
scoundrels,” and has become a continent where government officials do not serve the
people, and where “anyone with an official designation can pillage at will.”142 The
infamous excesses of such vicious tyrants as Mobutu and Bokassa, he suggests, are
mere manifestations of a wider problem that has bedevilled the continent since
independence.143 One of these, he notes, is the systematic undermining of State
institutions by the region’s rulers as a way of strengthening their own grip on power.
Thus, although every country in the region has a judicial system, their primary
purpose is to serve the interests of the elite, while violating the basic rights of the
poor. 144
¶47
For van de Walle, Africa’s state of “permanent crisis” stems simply from
“neopatrimonialism,” an essentially client list approach to governance which relies on
a system of “favors” and “privileged access to public resources;” an inherently corrupt
system in which the traditional divide between the public and private spheres has
become blurred, and which forms the basis of policy choices that ultimately result in
economic chaos.145 This, he argues, has in turn created an “aid -dependency
syndrome,” as donor agencies attempt to fill the gap, often assuming the roles of
government in many respects, with the result that “[b]y the early 1990s, Africa’s
relationship with the international economy was almost entirely mediated by public
aid flows.”146
¶48
What makes the above two views so instructive is the fact that although there is
no evidence of collaboration between the authors, they both point to a single factor:
the catastrophic failure of leadership. 147 Both also validate an earlier study by the
World Bank, which reached a similar conclusion: “It is in sub-Saharan Africa that the
deterioration in the state’s effectiveness has been most severe – the result of eroding
civil service wages, heavy dependence on aid, and patronage politics.” 148 The study
also notes that the majority now have lower “state capability” than they did at
independence, adding, “[a]n institutio nal vacuum of significant proportions has
emerged in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, leading to increased crime and an
absence of security, affecting investment and growth.”149
A. Africa’s Misrule: Its Unique Features
¶49

Elitist exploitation is not a peculiarly African problem; it could, after all, be
argued that every society in the world is ruled by some kind of elitist clique, at least
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insofar as it pursues an agenda that is not primarily or exclusively in the interest of the
people it governs. For example, the Bush Administration in the United States, like
many of its predecessors, is believed to be deeply beholden to certain corporate
interests through an inherently corrupt party funding system which makes a nonsense
of America’s claim of being a truly representative democracy. 150 Neither are
dictatorial regimes an African invention. As highlighted by Wade Mansell,
dictatorships are not respecters of geography. 151 Indeed, almost without exception, the
entire Arab world is ruled by some of the most corrupt regimes in history. Nor is
brutality an exclusively African preoccupation. For every Idi Amin in Africa, there
has been a Pol Pot in Asia, or a Hitler in Europe. Moreover, kleptocratic misrule is
hardly an exclusively African phenomenon. For every Mobutu or Abacha, the world
has witnessed the Marcoses, a Samoza, or the Ceausescus – just a few examples of
rulers who regarded their countries’ wealth as their own personal assets. Indeed, a
recent Channel 4 television programme revealed that Edward Shevardnadze’s Georgia
was ridden with graft, with aid funds being appropriated by government officials and
drug enforcement agents dealing in the very substances they were supposed to be
confiscating. 152 Moreover, a recent and rare first-hand account of life in North Korea
under the macabre tyranny of Kim Jong Il by a former official of the aid organization,
World Vision, reveals that very few African rulers can match this regime in terms of
its ability, not just to deny basic human rights to its people, but to also control their
very thoughts and daily lives through a bizarre and thoroughly dehumanizing socio political experiment called “Juche”. 153 Indeed, a recent BBC documentary, “This
World”, also revealed, among other violations, the starvation of its citizens by the
regime, as well as credible accounts of routine testing of chemical and biological
agents on the inmates at its secret Prison Camp 22, the victims including women, and
children. 154 Even poverty itself is evidently not a uniquely African experience, at least
insofar as it exists, albeit in relative terms, even in the richest societies of the world.
¶50
What makes the African experience unique, however, is a combination of
internal and external factors. Internally, there is amongst African rulers themselves a
definite, cult- like determination to preserve the status quo, complete with the ritual of
annual OAU (now AU) “summits,” the purposes of which are only understood by “the
brotherhood.”155 Indeed, the very idea of the AU, with its infinite list of impressive
aims – such as the establishment of the “Pan-African Parliament”, the “Court of
Justice” and certain “Financial Institutions” – made up of the African Central Bank,
the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank 156 – not to mention
some twenty nine other “Treaties, Conventions, Protocols and Charters”, is based, like
the tenets of secret cults, on an a belief in scientific impossibilities. It is, after all,
logically impossible to create such supranational institutions from the economic and
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political shambles that currently constitute the various member-states of the “Union.”
Political gimmickry may be an intrinsic feature of international relations (and in this
respect, the AU may not be different from the Arab League) but nowhere else in the
world has it been turned, effectively, into a development strategy.
¶51
The other level at which this cult-like solidarity manifests itself is in regard to
political – and by extension, economic – accountability, where the notion of an
“African solution” trumps every other consideration. A reaffirmation of the insidious
notion of cultural relativism at its worst, this mindset has little room for victims of
human rights violations.
¶52
Two examples illustrate this point. First, in spite of the fact that Mugabe’s
conduct has violated every known aspect of African culture, not to mention
internationally recognized human rights norms, no African ruler has been willing to
condemn him to date. On the contrary, their conduct at recent Commonwealth
summits simply confirms their determination to preserve “the brotherhood” at the
expense of everything else. 157 Indeed, even Nelson Mandela’s own successor, Thabo
Mbeki, has not concealed his anger at the international community for criticizing
Mugabe. He is reported to have stated recently: “The land question has disappeared
from the global discourse about Zimbabwe, except...to highlight the plight of former
white landowners.”158 So determined has Mbeki been to strengthen (and broaden) “the
brotherhood” that he recently travelled to Haiti, where he reportedly spent
$1.5million, effectively celebrating the kleptocratic despotism of the now exiled JeanBertrand Aristide. 159 And from all indications, he was even prepared to extend
military support to that regime. 160 The attitude of the AU could be contrasted with that
of the Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries, which, although not
composed of quintessential democrats, has demonstrated its willingness to emancipate
their citizen from poverty, as noted earlier. 161
¶53
The evident contempt for human r ights by African rulers has in turn prompted
near-palpable cynicism from some Western leaders, who appear to regard even the
most atrocious amongst the former as a “partner” in the development of the
continent. 162 This was much in evidence at a conference organized by President
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Chirac of France on the region titled “Africa and France, Together in Their New
Partnership,” to which every ruler on the continent – except leaderless Somalia’s –
was invited. Even Mugabe was also invited, in spite of a supposed EU-wide travel
ban. 163 In any event, African rulers had reportedly threatened to boycott the
conference if Mugabe was excluded.164 Thus, a coincidence of selfish interests
between the French government and African despots took precedence over every
other consideration, including the need to isolate rulers who evidently constitute an
impediment to the realization of the basic needs of the people of the region.
¶54
To be sure, the French government does not operate in isolation. British Premier
Tony Blair also appears determined to safeguard this “partnership” regardless of the
outcome: In a speech delivered with characteristic messianic zeal, he told his Labour
party activists in October of 2001 that Africa was “a scar on the conscience of the
world” which needed to be “healed.” “A partnership for Africa...based around the
New African Initiative” he added, “is there to be done if we find the will.”165 What
has become of that “partnership” three years afterwards remains to be explained. In
the meantime, the Prime Minister has set up a new Commission for Africa, whose role
“will be a comprehensive assessment of the situation in Africa and policies towards
Africa.”166 Indeed, the word “partnership” was more recently echoed, with equal
passion, by his former International Development Secretary, Baroness Amos
(currently leader of the House of Lords) in a radio debate, in response to a suggestion
that Africa is, more than anything else, a casualty of bad government.167 Nor are these
Western leaders alone in this cynical enterprise. A visit to the websites of various
multilateral agencies (including the UN’s) reveals an apparently obligatory obsession
with the idea of a “partnership” with these rulers.168 The neo-conservative American
think-tank, the Heritage Foundation, may not have much to offer in terms of solutions
to Africa’s problems (except perhaps for the much discredited SAPs or its variants);
but a description, by one of its commentators, of the region as “a playground for spoilt
despots wreaking havoc on their fiefdoms” could not be more appropriate.169
¶55
In criticising the nature of the relationship between international actors and
African rulers, it is necessary to acknowledge that these same actors are also actively
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engaged with obnoxious regimes the world over. Successive US Administrations, for
example, have been unflinching allies of the decadent and repressive Saudi dynasty
for many decades, as have their British counterparts. The United Nations, for its part,
has maintained a presence in various countries with questionable human rights
regimes – and appropriately so, given its human rights mandate.170 Thus, on the
surface, it could be argued that engagement by the international community with
African despots is not unique. However, this would ignore the very nature of these
relationships: As well as being premised on cynicism, they are also based on what
might be called deliberate ignorance. This almost certainly stems from the fact that, in
general, very few of these actors ever attempt to understand the political, sociological,
and indeed the economic environments in which they operate. So much, after all, has
been acknowledged by the World Bank’s former Chief Economist who has offered an
insight into the astonishingly cavalier and routine manner in which its sister
organization, the IMF, conducts its business. 171 This, moreover, is the theme of
Graham Hancock’s widely-cited book, Lords of Poverty, which highlights how
virtually no consideration is given by aid donors to its supposed beneficiaries. 172 It
follows that in the context of SSA, their policies are inexorably premised upon a
misreading of the relationship between the victims of poverty and their ruling elites.
The selfish interests of Africa’s ruling elites, it appears, are the same as those of the
region’s longsuffering peop le. How else can one explain the fact that African rulers
continue to receive foreign aid of every description (so much so that the region has
become the most aid -dependent in the world), 173 without such inflows being strictly
conditional upon the extent to which they are channelled towards poverty
alleviation? 174
¶56
Ignorance of Africa on the part of international actors is also influenced by a
debilitating kind of political correctness – a patronizing of interests fuelled by a desire
not to be seen to be critical of rulers who are invariably considered to be victims of
colonial or some other injustice. Again, this attitude does not recognize the evident
distinction between the region’s rulers and their selfish interests, and the real victims
of economic misery. As pointed out by Ayittey, to do so would be seen as “blaming
the victim.”175 The upshot of this attitude is that whereas the odious regime in Saudi
Arabia, for example, is condemned for what it is, and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea a
subject of universal derision or opprobrium, African dictatorships are seen as
“partners.” It also explains the fact that although many commentators are willing to
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blame Kim Jong Il, for example, for his people’s suffering, criticisms of African
rulers are often invariably tempered with references to so-called exogenous factors.
¶57
Moreover, this uncritical engagement has spawned what might be called an
“initiatives industry,” with international actors seemingly determined to match, and in
most cases, surpass, every escapist antic embarked upon by African rulers. 176 It comes
as no surprise, therefore, that Africa has become the most aid -dependent region in the
world, while the basic needs of its people have remained at best largely ignored by
both sides in this cynical enterprise, as effort s are intensified towards preserving the
“partnership.” This is one area in which there needs to be radical change if ordinary
Africans are ever to begin to enjoy the basic rights proclaimed under the ICESCR.
B. Economic Rights Violations: An Instrument of Despotic Misrule
¶58

Much, of course, has been written on SSA, and from various disciplinary
perspectives. Regrettably, this vast literature mainly articulates the region’s problems
in terms of either the consequences of an unfair, neo- liberal global trading regime or
of poor policy choices – usually a euphemism for the non-adoption of exclusively
neo-liberal economic policies. 177 Even within the context of human rights advocacy,
violations of civil and political rights have traditionally been given priority over
violations of economic rights, although it is necessary to acknowledge that this
appears to be changing. 178 This means that the benefits accruing from violations of
economic rights to African rulers have received very little or no attention. 179
¶59
This, however, is not difficult to understand: the traditional (if fictional)
separation of the two categories of human rights aside, it is easier to explain why the
violation of civil and political rights might serve a despot’s interests – primarily, his
determination to remain in power – than it is to comprehend how his violation of
economic rights might serve the same purpose. A clampdown on freedom of
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expression, 180 for example, is a tried and tested means of stifling debate – and thus of
popular agitation for change – just as the denial of participatory rights 181 by a oneparty regime eliminates effective political opposition.
¶60
On the contrary, it could be argued that because the denial of the rights to food
or healthcare might engender a sense of marginalization and provoke a popular
revolution, this cannot serve the same purpose as denials of civil and political rights.
The recent uprising against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti, and his ignominious flight
from the country might indeed be cited as a case in point. But then, in the case of
Haiti, the impact of pressure from the American and French governments, above
anything else, cannot be discounted as the deciding factor. Indeed, it is reported that
he was “bundled on to a plane” by US troops. 182 With no such geographical proximity
(and hence, an immediate threat from refugees) to the United States, SSA remains in
an entirely different position. At any rate, a combination of illiteracy, poverty, hunger,
homelessness and disease has rendered its people simply incapable of demanding
political and economic change. African rulers have therefore come to appreciate their
utility – hence, their preference for escapist gimmickry, such as NEPAD or the
hopelessly grandiose aims of the AU, as a substitute for simple, practical steps a imed
at poverty alleviation. Economic emancipation therefore represents as much a threat
to despotism as freedom of expression, or the right to participate in “genuine periodic
elections” as envisaged under the ICCPR.183 It thus becomes possible to assert that in
much of Africa, poverty is not simply an unfortunate state of affairs, nor, as is often
suggested, a consequence of globalization or other factors; it is, on the contrary, an
effective means of mass disempowerment by rulers whose only concern is the
exercise of power without the attendant responsibilities. 184 The same is true of
Africa’s endless wars, which, aside from the direct material benefits that often flow
from them, 185 remove any vestiges of accountability, and make the ruler’s position
unassailab le. They also make it possible to embark on a “rights violating spree,”
including the commission of such horrific crimes as rape, mutilations, and the
conscription of child soldiers; thereby making it unnecessary to build hospitals or
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schools, not to mention the basic State institutions and infrastructure, without which
no governmental functions can take place.
C. Somalia: Experimenting With Mobocracy
¶61

Current developments in Somalia offer what is arguably the best illustration of
how leadership has been the impediment to Africa’s economic emancipation. Somalia
has not only become a failed State in every imaginable respect, but is almost certainly
the only “mobocracy” in the world. But Somalia’s collapse did not happen by
accident. Since becoming independent in 1960, it was plagued by warlordism. 186 The
post-independence regime was overthrown in 1969 by a man called Siad Barre, under
whom the country became a pawn in the Cold War rivalry. In the meantime,
expansionist ambitions on the part of Barre saw the country at war with neighbouring
Ethiopia in an attempt to create a “Greater Somaliland,” although the massive aid –
first from the Soviet Union, later from the United States, and then from the Italian
Socialists – it had received never reached its people. The economy, needless to add,
was already in ruins by 1980 when the IMF intervened. 187 In the meantime, every sign
of protest was met with brutal repression. According to Human Rights Watch, the
Barre regime “unleashed a reign of terror against [civilians of the Isaaq clan] killing
50,000 to 60,000 between May 1988 and January 1990.”188 The collapse of the
country in the 1990s was therefore a near-certainty.
¶62
What makes Somalia particularly instructive in relation to the African tragedy is
the fact that it is is, asto nishingly, now enjoying a degree of stability that even its
previous rulers were unable – or unwilling – to bring about. In what must be one of
the most perverse political and economic developments in history, the prevalent
anarchy has even spawned a thriving multi-purpose company called al-Barakaat,
which had once grown to became the largest employer in the country, its interests
including banking, postal services and telecommunications, with a shareholding of
600.189 Of late, other developments have been noted in areas such as livestock
production, road building, water and electricity. Media houses have in fact also
sprung up. 190 And although clan warfare and mob rule remain central features of
daily life, a BBC source notes that “[t]he country has one of the most dynamic
economies in the East African region and is effectively an economy without a
state."191 In one sense, it is possible to dismiss these developments simply as a bizarre
fluke, the dynamics of which cannot yet be known, not least because this would be
impossible in a state of literal anarchy. If and when normality ensues, future research
would almost certainly offer a more revealing insight. This, however, would ignore
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one important point: that given the right kind of leadership (and one capable o f giving
vent to the ingenuity already demonstrated by the Somali people), their level of
economic development can only be imagined. Indeed, the very fact that so much has
emerged from this tragic chaos serves as an eternal indictment against certain socalled governments on the continent of Africa.
VI. A HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION?
¶63

Assuming, therefore, that leadership constitutes the obstacle to the realization of
human rights in Africa, this invariably raises questions regarding what measures
might be appropriate as a way of emancipating its longsuffering people. In proposing
a “human rights solution,” it is recognized that law is merely one possible means of
effecting the desired change. It is, after all, the case that concerted political pressure,
for example, might prove more effective: As noted in Part V, it was political pressure
from the United States and France which, more than anything else, brought the
Aristide misrule in Haiti to its belated end. Indeed, an essentially economic measure
could be just as effective: the imposition of targeted sanctions against individual
actors within a rights-violating regime, which should necessarily involve the
confiscation of stolen State assets (and their proceeds), would make a Mobutu or an
Abacha -style “rule by theft” inherently unprofitable for those concerned. Regrettably,
neither of these can be considered a realistic possibility: A Haiti-style solution, for
example, would have to be repeated in over 40 different countries on the continent,
while the kind of targeted sanctions envisaged would certainly be resisted by the
powerful Western banking institutions in which the stolen funds are hidden. 192 At any
rate, given that this is primarily a law-based critique – not to mention the fact that
political will on the part of the international community to adopt the above measures
is simply non-existent – only the legal possibilities will be explored.
¶64
As of March 2003, the majority of countries in SSA had ratified the two
Covenants. 193 By so doing, African rulers, like other world leaders, explicitly pledged
themselves to the realization of the rights proclaimed therein.194 Indeed, even within
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the context of customary international law, the UN Declaration on the Right to
Development, for example, explicitly identifies the State as the primary guarantor of
human rights. 195 Thus, any examination of the problems faced by the region must
necessarily begin with an acknowledgement of the legal obligations that its rulers
have voluntarily undertaken, a deliberate breach of which should serve as a
convenient basis for the sanctions to be examined. Before exploring such legal
remedies, however, it is pertinent to acknowledge that an attempt to invoke them
would not be unproblematic, although as will be shown later, these in themselves are
not insurmountable obstacles.
A. The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations
¶65

The first of these apparent obstacles relates to the nature of States Parties’
obligations as spelled out under the ICESCR itself: to “take steps...to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view of achieving progressively the full realization” of
economic rights.196 A number of related problems immediately spring to mind in this
regard, the first being the indeterminate nature of the phrase “to the maximum of its
available resources.” This inherent vagueness means that it lends itself very easily to
subjective interpretation, especially by regimes intent on keeping their citizens in
perpetual misery. Indeed, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(hereinafter the Committee) 197 alluded to this possibility by noting that this concept is
often treated by governments merely as a statement of intent, as opposed to “a
necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the
difficulties involved for any co untry in ensuring full realization of [economic
rights].”198 The Committee however went on to explain that Article 2(1) “imposes an
obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal.”199
Interestingly, various experts on this subject, acting in concert with certain interested
parties, including the UN Centre for Human Rights, had earlier proclaimed the muchcited Limburg Principles (and ten years later, the Maastricht Guidelines) echoing
similar views in an attempt to explain the nature of States Parties obligations. 200
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant...” See also ICESCR, supra note 194, Art.2, “[e]ach State
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the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”
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But how, it might be asked, are countries that are too poor to realize these
rights, supposed to take steps to realize them? There is little doubt that at first sight,
this apparent contradiction seems as self-expla natory as the basic legal maxim: nemo
dat quod non habet – one, after all, cannot give that which he does not have. This,
however, must not be the end of the argument, not least because the question of
resources can itself become a most convenient excuse for egregious violations. At any
rate, as explained within the Limburg Principles, “[t] he obligation of progressive
achievement exists independently of the increase in resources; it requires effective use
of resources available.”201 Moreover, in its Human Dev elopment Report for the year
1990, the United Nations Development Programme stated: “Developing countries are
not too poor to pay for human development...Most budgets can...accommodate
additional spending on human development by reorienting national priorities...”202
The report cites defence spending as one area where countries tend to waste their
scarce resources.203 To this could be added the “white elephant” projects and blatant
misuse of public funds on the part of African rulers (some of which are outlined in
Part III). Thus, this apparently insurmountable problem can be mitigated by a simple
reordering of priorities by governments in the region.
¶67
The second problem relating to the nature of States Parties’ obligations is that
an international tribunal (of the kind envisaged herein) charged with determining
whether a ruler of a poor country has violated his people’s right to food, for example,
might wonder whether this is not an essentially economic question, 204 as opposed to
one involving a breach of international law. What is being proposed in this article,
however, is not the indictment of every ruler for every violation of every right
proclaimed under the ICESCR, just as the International Criminal Court, for example,
is not mandated to adjudicate on every violation of every right under the ICCPR. 205
Nor would a single case of malaria, even if caused by a failure to provide essential
drugs in hospitals, necessarily result in an indictment. On the contrary, what is
envisaged is conduct that results in the scale of suffering of the kind highlighted at the
outset. Much, therefore, would depend on the severity and scale of the violation(s)
alleged: The conduct of the accused must have been so objectively blameworthy, and
the harm in question so easily avoidable that it could reasonably be held to have been
a flagrant violation of not just the relevant right under the ICESCR, but also of the
right to human dignity which, after all, is the very essence of human rights, as
proclaimed under the various international instruments. 206 In other words, a broad
liability threshold would have to be established, to be mitigated only by a “best
endeavour” defence on the part of the accused.
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The third apparent obstacle in regard to the nature of States Parties’ obligations
is the very notion of “progressive realization” itself, which invariably entails
extensive data accumulation and analysis, a task which poor countries with inadequate
manpower, institutions and infrastructure cannot hope to accomplish, and which
therefore arguably defeats the essence of the notion itself. Indeed, it was in the light of
this that a former Rapporteur to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights
proposed her much-cited “violations approach,” based, as she explains, on the existing
monitoring processes o f other human rights instruments.207 Moreover, as pointed out
by Steiner and Alston, the monitoring of economic rights is “especially challenging”
because of “the scope of the rights, the diversity of the means by which they might be
made operational, and the inevitably complex relationship between rights and
resources.”208 From a legal perspective, they assert, the challenge is how to reconcile,
through the monitoring process, the notion of progressive realization with the
practicalities of resource constraint s, while acknowledging the dramatic disparities in
financial and administrative capacities between countries. 209 Yet, as the concept itself
suggests, what is envisaged is not the immediate realization of universal standards
applicable to every right proclaimed by the ICESCR. On the contrary, what is
required is a serious attempt on the part of governments to realize these rights,
beginning with the most fundamental ones, particularly those relating to basic human
needs. This, after all, would explain the reliance, by the Committee, on the so-called
“minimum core content” approach, focusing on the realization of such basic rights as
food, healthcare, housing, and education. 210 An individual complaints procedure
broadly similar to that which already exists under the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR is also being proposed. 211 It thus becomes possible to argue that these
difficulties, at the very worst, are in no sense dissimilar to those that exist within other
international human rights instruments.
B. The Language of the ICESCR
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The language employed by the drafters of the ICESCR is widely believed to be
merely exhortatory and therefore non-binding. 212 Indeed, even some renowned
international lawyers who are known advocates of economic rights have raised
questions regarding the extent to which the Covenant lends itself to effective
enforcement. 213 Whether such a material difference exists between the two Covenants
207
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is however debatable, not least because most of the rights proclaimed under the
ICCPR are not expressed in the absolute, non-derogable terms that are often ascribed
to them: Even the right to life, for example, is only guaranteed to the extent that it is
not infringed arbitrarily.214 At any rate, even if the ICESCR were to pose such a
problem, this would be no more serious that those which confront the municipal
courts from time to time; hence, the development of well-established rules of
interpretation, particularly in the common law world. For example, where a literal
interpretation would result in an absurdity, judges have always been at liberty adopt
the “golden rule,” or its close variant, the “mischief rule,” which gives an intended
effect to the instrument 215 – the “mischief” here being the need to uphold the inherent
dignity of the human person as proclaimed in the Preambles to the two Covenants).
Indeed, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties offers useful guidance in this
regard by stipulating that a treaty “be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose”216 [emphasis added]. There is therefore a danger of
overstating the significance of this apparent difference, thus accentuating a fictional
distinction between rights that have, after all, been universally recognized as
interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible.217
C. The Question of Enforcement218
¶70

As already pointed out, the “enforcement” of economic rights as such takes
place through the process of supervision by above Committee, which merely monitors
the extent to which its States Parties claim to have realized the rights proclaimed
within it,219 particularly through the mechanism of State reporting – a process which,
by all accounts (and amongst other flaws), relies entirely on the goodwill and sincerity
of the very governments that stand accused of the violations in question. It was, after
all, a veteran of the same Committee who, reflecting on how it might be seen by a lay
person, once described it as: “...a system that makes governments entirely responsible
for reporting on themselves, once every five years, subject to soft questioning for a
few hours by cautious committees, elected by those very governments, and with
almost no likelihood of serious censure or sanctions.”220
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However, the absence of a more effective mechanism for their enforcement
should in no sense imply their unenforceability in a coercive sense. Indeed, as will be
shown in this section, there are instructive precedents in this regard, both under
municipal and international law. In any event, the ICESCR is not unique in not having
its own coercive internal enforcement mechanism. An examination of the ICCPR
reveals that it has no such mechanism either. 221 Yet, such internal limitations have
been shown to constitute no bar to the effective enforcement of the rights recognized
under the ICCPR. The establishment, by the UN Security Council, of ad- hoc tribunals
for the prosecution of individuals accused of serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia 222 and Rwanda223 serve as examples of
how such internal instrumental limitations can be overcome, while the establishment
of the International Criminal Court puts this ad-hoc approach (though primarily to the
enforcement of civil and political rights) on a permanent basis. 224 Indeed, the fact that
the UK authorities were legally obliged (by virtue of the Torture Convention) 225 to
arrest and examine the possibility of extraditing Pinochet to Spain on allegations of
torture was further illustration of this reality, 226 although this must now be read in
light of a decision by the International Court of Justice concerning a Congolese
foreign minister accused of violating the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of crimes
against humanity. 227 What these demonstrate, nevertheless, is that there are no
conceptual or practical obstacles to holding State officials to account for grave
violations of economic rights in the manner envisaged, albeit only after they would
have left office, provided the political will exists at the international level.
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D. The Problem of National Sovereignty
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The vexed question of national sovereignty poses a real obstacle to the
indictment and punishment of rulers who violate their people’s economic rights.
Arguably the cornerstone of international relations, it is rooted in Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State...” What this means is that governments that, as noted in Part
IV, are notoriously resistant to external scrutiny are even less likely to be receptive to
any interference in regard to matters that are essentially economic. Indeed, they may
even invoke their right to self-determination as guaranteed under the two Covenants
with some justification. 228 Moreover, although developments post-WWII have
consistently shown that national sovereignty represents no bar to external scrutiny
where serious human rights violations are alleged, such developments have primarily
(and almost exclusively) been confined to the broad sphere of civil and political
rights. 229 Thus, any attempt to extend them to economic rights would, prima facie, be
breaking new ground.
¶73
Paradoxically, however, these same post-war developments also suggest that
indictments for violations of economic rights would not necessarily involve such a
radical change, conceptual or practical. For example, whether by design or by default,
even the UN Security Council has explicitly invoked its powers under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter to prevent what were essentially, though by no means exclusively,
violations of economic rights in certain countries, Somalia being a prime example. 230
Indeed, it could be argued that any intervention on humanitarian grounds is essentially
aimed at protecting the economic rights of those affected, at least insofar as such
Resolutions include a mandate to guarantee the delivery of emergency relief such as
food, shelter and medical care. The principle, therefore, is that where violations are
considered to pose a threat to international peace and security, the sovereignty of the
State concerned becomes an irrelevant consideration.
E. The Question of Liability by Omission
¶74

One further apparent problem with an indictment for violations of economic
rights would be the fact that the very nature of the rights proclaimed under the
ICESCR strongly suggests that liability would be incurred mainly by way of an
omission, and not by positive conduct. Indeed, the Limburg Principles employ the
term “failure” in describing what amounts to a violation of economic rights. 231 The
question, therefore, is whether the notion of criminal liability by omission is a known
concept in international law. A good starting point would be a brief consideration of
228

Arts.1(1) common to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, which proclaim the right of peoples to inter
alia, “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” ICCPR, supra note 2, 999
U.N.T.S. at 173; ICESCR, supra note 2, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
229
For an insightful account of this gradual evolution, see Nigel S. Rodley, The Evolution of United
Nations’ Charter-Based Machinery for the Protection of Human Rights 1 EUR. HUM . RTS. L. REV. 4
(1997).
230
See S. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, X Sess., 3188th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993). Of particular
note is paragraph 4,which “[r]equests the Secretary -General...to provide humanitarian and other
assistance to the people of Somalia...”). Id. A similar Resolution recognizes that “the restoration of law
and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations...” S. Res. 837, U.N.
SCOR, X Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993).
231
Indeed, the Limburg Principles employ the term “failure” in describing what amounts to a violation
of the ICESCR. See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 200, at ¶¶ 70-73.

English law, where this principle has had a long history. At the risk of
oversimplification, the general principle is that liability can flow from an omission,
provided it can be shown that the accused had a duty of care (an obligation not
dissimilar to those undertaken by governments under Article 2 of the ICESCR)
towards the victim. By a remarkable coincidence, many of the judicial authorities in
this regard relate to aspects of economic rights. 232 The most authoritative decision to
date is R v Adomako,233 where the House of Lords upheld a conviction for gross
negligence manslaughter, because the accused, an anaesthetist, had treated his patient
(to whom he obviously owed a duty of care) in a manner that was considered to be
abysmally below what could reasonably be expected of a physician of his experience.
In other words, he had failed to exercise this duty to the standard expected of a person
with his skills and experience.
¶75
At the international level, the relevant authorities are to be found in the areas of
international criminal or humanitarian law, where the position is not dissimilar to that
under English law. As pointed out by a former judge (and later, President) of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “[i]nternational criminal
liability may arise not only as a result of a positive act...but also from an omission,
that is, failure to take action...when the law imposed a clear obligation to act and the
person wilfully or recklessly failed to do what was legally required.”234 Examples
cited include the duties imposed by various provisions of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 governing the conduct of parties during armed conflict, breaches of which
constitute violations of the law of war. 235 Indeed, duties very similar to those
undertaken under the ICESCR can be found under the Second Geneva Convention,
which provides that enemy combatants who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked “shall
not be wilfully left without medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions exposing
them to contagion or infection be created.”236 Even more remarkable are Articles 55
and 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which impose an obligation on an
Occupying Power to provide food, medical supplies, public health and hygiene to the
civilian population “to the fullest extent of the means available,”237 and Article 69(1)
of the First Additional Protocol which obliges an Occupying Power to provide the
means for satisfying the basic needs of the civilian population, again, “to the fullest
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possible extent of the means availab le.”238 Violations of these instruments, it is worth
noting, constitute war crimes. 239 These thus make it possible to argue that if breaches
of obligations similar to those imposed by the ICESCR could attract that level of
liability, there is indeed no excuse for not regarding breaches of the Covenant
(particularly those relating to the “minimum core obligations” already spelled out) as
being of the same degree of seriousness.
¶76
The “human rights solution” proposed herein is therefore not new in any sense,
at least insofar as clear and authoritative precedents exist both under municipal and
international law, for punishing those who cause death or unnecessary suffering by
omission, specifically in relation to certain basic rights now recognized within the
ICESCR. The idea is that rulers who either deliberately abandon their elementary
obligations towards their citizens, or expose them, for example through massive
corruption, to avoidable economic misery such as famine, homelessness (e.g., through
wars, which result in mass migration), and/or disease would be treated in the same
way as those who violate the peremptory norms of international law. This would have
two related positive outcomes for human rights advocacy: It would reaffirm the
importance of the core elements of economic rights to the notion of human dignity
(without which other human rights become meaningless) and in the process, elevate
economic rights to the level of importance that is increasingly being accorded to civil
and political rights. This, after all, would be the only logical meaning implied by the
various UN Declarations proclaiming the “indivisibility” and “interdependence” of
human rights. 240
F. A “Crimes Against Humanity” Approach?
¶77

In proposing the possible indictment of rulers for violations of economic rights,
one commentator has persuasively advocated a “Crimes Against Humanity” approach,
to be based on existing frameworks in international criminal law. 241 Her thesis is that
“the definition of crimes against humanity is open-ended enough to include
economic...rights...and the concept does not require an international conflict, but
rather systematic and large-scale abuse for it to be triggered.”242 Of particular interest,
amongst the various instruments cited is Article 7(k) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC Statute) which defines crimes against humanity to
include: “other inhumane acts...intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or mental and physical health.”
¶78
There is little doubt that the phrase “other inhumane acts...” would clearly cover
certain violations of economic rights. For example, the infliction of bodily harm on a
prisoner, while primarily a violation of the Torture Convention, 243 is also an
inherently inhumane act. Indeed, very few observers would deny that this would also
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be a direct violation of the victim’s right to health – a core aspect of economic rights.
Yet, the ICC Statute does not recognize violations of economic rights as such. At first
sight, this should not pose any insur mountable difficulty, since the envisaged tribunal
would almost certainly not be concerned with any apparent distinction between the
two categories of rights, especially given that that would be against the established
rules of customary international law.244 Indeed, as the above cases (Sumida Haruzo &
others, and Gozawa Sadaichi & others) illustrate, violations of economic rights had
been punished as war crimes even before the drafting of the ICESCR. The point to
note, however, is that the core elements of economic rights, particularly the rights to
food, health, and housing, are too essential to human existence and dignity to be
treated, in effect, merely as incidental rights.
¶79
Moreover, although the ICC Statute does not address itself explicitly and
exclusively to crimes committed during armed conflict, the very nature of the crimes
outlined under Articles 5-8,245 and the degree of seriousness required, 246 lend
themselves easily (rightly or wrongly) to this interpretation. This being the case, it
becomes safe to argue that for violations of economic rights to be punished under the
heading of crimes against humanity, there must almost certainly have been an armed
conflict (in which case a violation of economic rights would be considered under the
category of “other inhumane acts”) which, in any event, excludes liability for
omissions on a literal interpretation. Yet, although contemporary Africa has come to
be defined by endless wars (as noted in Part III) many of the most serious violations
of economic rights in the region take place in non-conflict situations. Moreover,
although mass impoverishment of the kind described therein might be said to be a
function of positive conduct (e.g., the transfer of State assets into personal accounts
abroad), the resulting human rights violations remain, essentially, crimes of omission.
Thus, while a “crimes against humanity approach” is undoubtedly an attractive
proposition, it would not be adequate to deal effectively with the African status quo.
What is being proposed herein, t herefore, is a recognition of the inherent importance
of economic rights, either by broadening the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court by an Additional Protocol, or by the establishment of a separate tribunal for the
same purpose. There is, in other words, a need for a degree of clarity that befits the
nature of the rights in question, as well as the nature of the punishment envisaged.
VII.
¶80

CONCLUSIONS

This article became necessary in the light of the very human tragedies that have
defined sub-Saharan Africa since decolonization, and which continue to inflict untold
suffering on its people even as the world begins to settle into the 21st century. In the
course of the critique, it became clear that contrary to common assumptions, these
tragedies are simply the direct consequence of an inability (or unwillingness) on the
part of its rulers to attach any degree of seriousness to their legal responsibilities
towards their citizens. Yet, the tragic irony is that as the people of Somalia have so
clearly demonstrated, ordinary Africans are a remarkably self-reliant and resourceful
people – a people quite capable of liberating themselves from economic misery if
given the chance.
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Given, however, that they are very unlikely to be given that opportunity (for
reasons discussed in Part V), it becomes necessary to argue that the necessary change
would have to be initiated from outside the region, and at two levels: First,
international actors must desist from predicating their engagement with the region’s
rulers on the gratuitously emotive notion of a “partnership” and instead, should adopt
a more discerning approach, with the aim of offering appropriate inducements to
those who take their people’s rights sufficiently seriously. 247
¶82
Change is also considered necessary in the very nature of human rights
advocacy itself. First, there is a need to highlight the fact that in addition to the
explicit undertaking by States Parties to the two Covenants, customary international
law (as evidenced by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development) imposes the
primary responsibility for the realization of human rights on governments. Thus, the
traditional exclusive focus on exogenous factors in an attempt to explain Africa’s
problems is no longer tenable. Secondly, as with civil and political rights, where the
violation of economic rights undermines the dignity of the victims on a scale already
described, the possible criminalization of those concerned should be a foremost
consideration in human rights advocacy. This, after all, would be one way of giving
any real meaning to the rhetoric proclaiming the indivisibility and interdependence of
human rights.
¶83
To be sure, any permanent solution to Africa’s problems will have to come
from Africa; this, if nothing else, is the very essence of the right to self-determination.
However, given how disempowered many of its people have become, this cannot be a
practical possibility in the short term. Neither can the world afford to wait for longterm solutions to emerge, given the urgency of the situation. The international
community cannot therefore afford to abandon millions of helpless people to the
whims of rulers who have proved themselves so instinctively contemptuous of their
basic needs, and totally insensitive to their suffering.
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